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1.  Introduction 
In countries with weak legal protection for investors, strong evidence indicates 
that entrepreneurs often tunnel resources out of firms, i.e., expropriate funds that 
rightfully belong to minority shareholders (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer 2000, Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer 2001).  However, the anecdotal evidence 
also suggests that sometimes entrepreneurs in these countries transfer private resources 
into firms that have minority shareholders.  Propping is often clandestine, but several 
examples came to light in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998.  
Lee Kun Hee, chairman of Samsung Electronics and head of the family that controls 
Samsung Group, donated some of his personal wealth to pay off the debts of Samsung 
Motors Inc, which was a subsidiary on the verge of bankruptcy in summer 1999 (Wall 
Street Journal, July 1, 1999, p. A19).
2   The controlling shareholders in CP Group sold 
assets in Thailand and China apparently in order to inject cash into publicly listed Thai 
companies (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1998a.)
3   The Salim group sold privately 
held assets in the Netherlands in order to bail out publicly listed operations in both the 
Philippines and Indonesia (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1998b); it also injected funds 
from a publicly listed Hong Kong company into a publicly listed Indonesian company 
(Asian Wall Street Journal, 1999).
4  In many countries, the evidence suggests controlling 
shareholders use private funds to provide temporary support to a firm that is in trouble.
5   
This paper suggests that propping may be an important part of how firms operate 
in countries with weak legal environments.  In particular, it helps to explain why many 
firms in these countries rely heavily on debt finance.  A weak legal system would seem to 
make debt unappealing because creditors can never effectively take control of collateral.
6    4 
 
For example, most collapses of banks and firms in Russia after the devaluation of August 
1998 were associated with complete looting so that creditors and minority shareholders 
got nothing while the firms went out of business (Troika Dialog 1999).
7  The experience 
of creditors in Hong Kong who lent to firms doing business in Mainland China is 
similar.
8  Bankruptcy in Thailand typically takes up to 10 years and anecdotal evidence 
indicates that creditors ultimately receive very little through either court settlement 
(Foley 1999) or private debt renegotiations.
9  This paper suggests that the possibility of 
propping makes issuing debt attractive to entrepreneurs and investors, when courts cannot 
enforce contracts. 
Our interpretation of the evidence suggests that large business groups exhibit a 
form of the soft budget constraint, which is usually associated with government-backed 
enterprises or bank-supported firms (Dewatripont and Maskin 1995).  Because the 
funding source cannot commit not to bail out firms, it is tempted to bail them out ex post; 
hence, this expectation induces inefficient behavior (Roland 2000, p.215).  In contrast, 
we suggest that budget constraints are soft for large conglomerates in developing 
countries because the legal and regulatory environment is weak.  In this context, debt is a 
commitment by the entrepreneur to bail out a firm when there is a moderately bad shock.  
However, this debt also creates a potential cost in that it makes it more likely that the 
entrepreneur will abandon the firm, i.e., take the money and run when there is a very bad 
shock. 
  Our analysis has three parts.  First, we establish that firms in developing countries 
with weaker corporate governance also have a higher ratio of debt to total assets.  Firm-
level corporate governance and debt appear to be substitutes.  This relationship is most   5 
 
robust for Asian emerging market countries.  Second, we develop a simple model that 
explains this observation as propping.  Entrepreneurs choose how much to expropriate, as 
in Jensen and Meckling (1976), but they can also inject private cash today in order to 
preserve their options to expropriate and to obtain a legitimate share of profits 
tomorrow.
10  Both expropriation and propping cannot be monitored, prevented, or 
punished in countries with weak legal protection of investors.
11  If the legal system is 
weak, creditors cannot take possession of collateral but a firm that defaults on existing 
debts will not generally be able to borrow further.  In this framework, the direct effect of 
debt is to increase the potential for propping and make it more likely that outside 
investors will participate in financing the firm.
12 
From our perspective, debt commits the entrepreneur to bailing out a project and 
effectively establishes a credible soft-budget constraint, which is usually associated with 
government bailouts (Kornai 1979).  Soft-budget constraints in socialist countries and 
state-owned enterprises destroy incentives for good performance (Roland, 2000).  
However, in our model, the commitment to bail out a project may actually increase its 
value, because it reduces the incentive of an entrepreneur to expropriate investors when 
returns are temporarily low.  This debt-induced softening of a particular firm’s budget 
constraint may actually make it easier to attract outside investors.  La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) show that groups of connected firms are observed more 
frequently than stand-alone firms in most countries.  These groups typically control at 
least one company that is publicly traded or otherwise used to raise funds from outside 
investors, although with a number of other companies that are privately held without any 
outside investors.  Some valuable assets are usually kept private.  This type of   6 
 
organization is particularly common in emerging markets in which the legal protection of 
minority shareholder rights and creditors is weaker (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny, LLSV 1998 and 2002). 
Third, the empirical evidence suggests that the propensity to tunnel is higher for 
groups of interconnected firms, particularly if they are organized in pyramids.  We 
assume that the propensity to tunnel is correlated with the propensity to prop, i.e., that 
transfers in and out of firms are symmetric.  Using this assumption, we test for the 
presence of propping and find that a higher propensity to prop is associated with more 
debt, and with less adverse effects of debt on stock price when there is an adverse 
macroeconomic shock. 
We model tunnelling following LLSV (2002), Johnson, Boone, Breach and 
Friedman (2000), and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2000) and introduce the possibility of 
propping, i.e., negative tunnelling.  More generally, our model builds on the work of La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998, 2000, and 2002), who show 
that many countries do not protect investors adequately.   Specifically, in countries with 
weak investor protection, entrepreneurs can tunnel resources out of their firms in ways 
that cannot be prevented by outside investors (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer 2000).  Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001) show that firms in Asia that are lower 
down a pyramid, i.e., have a greater divergence between cash-flow and control rights, 
tend to have more leverage, but that this result does not hold in Europe.  These authors 
use different variables for the risk of expropriation and offer a different interpretation of 
the phenomenon.  Kim and Stone (1999) emphasize the importance of corporate debt in 
explaining the severity of the Asian financial crisis.   7 
 
  Section 2 establishes the correlation between corporate governance and debt in 
emerging markets.  Section 3 presents a simple dynamic model for an entrepreneur who 
has issued debt in a firm with minority shareholders.  Section 4 examines evidence from 
the Asian financial crisis to test the theory.  Section 5 concludes with directions for future 
research. 
 
2.  Evidence on Debt and Corporate Governance 
Theoretically, firms with stronger corporate governance may issue more or less 
debt.  For example, firms with better corporate governance may find it easier to issue 
debt or firms with better investment prospects may improve their corporate governance 
contemporaneously with issuing more debt.  Alternatively, firms may use the issue of 
debt as a substitute for improving corporate governance.  In this section, we seek to 
establish some basic robust facts for developing countries. 
We report firm-level regressions intended to measure the relationship between 
corporate governance and levels of debt.  Specifically, we estimate the following 
equation: 
Debt ratio = a + b1(Corporate Governance) +  b2(Size) + b3(Profitability) + 
b4(Growth) + b5(Industry Dummies) + b6(Country Dummies) + e,                  (1) 
 
where the inclusion of size, profitability, and growth follows Lee, Lee, and Lee (2000). 
This specification assumes that corporate governance at the firm level is an 
exogenous variable, e.g., it is given by the tastes of the entrepreneur.  This characteristic 
is consistent with firm-level literature and is developed further below.  Ideally, we would 
instrument for corporate governance but no suitable instrument is currently available.  As   8 
 
a result, these regressions may suffer from the usual problems of endogeneity, omitted 
variables, and measurement error.  Although the basic results are suggestive, we are not 
confident that these regressions are properly identified. 
{Insert Table 1 here} 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the firms.  In subsequent tables, we match 
our primary data with other data sources; thus the number of firms and countries covered 
varies in each table.  The primary data source is the September 1997 Worldscope disk.  
We chose this month because it appears to be the one that gives the most recent updates 
but also has no updates based on post-June 1997 data, i.e., the data are all pre-Asian 
crisis.  The data could be based on financial statements as late as June 1997; however, 
because the most popular fiscal year-end is December, the majority of these data are from 
the end of 1996.   
{Insert Table 2 here} 
Table 2 reports coefficient estimates from regressions of debt ratios on corporate 
governance ratings for 447 firms that are actively traded by international investors and 
held partly by investors who are not controlling shareholders.  Therefore these firms 
should be raising capital from outside investors.  Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) 
compiles the ratings used in Table 2 for companies in 25 emerging markets, i.e., the set of 
developing countries that are open to capital flows.
13  The selection bias is interesting 
because CLSA includes firms attractive to international investors.  CLSA rates firms on 
57 issues in seven areas of corporate governance.  For our measure, we take the simple 
average of CLSA’s ratings in the areas of transparency, independence, accountability, 
responsibility, and fairness.  We omit two of CLSA’s ratings, namely, the social-  9 
 
awareness rating because it does not relate directly to minority shareholder protection and 
the discipline rating because limiting the use of debt is one of the factors in its 
calculation.  The ratings are from 1 to 100, with a higher score indicating better corporate 
governance.
14  These ratings are for 2001, so we match them with Worldscope data from 
the same year. 
 The dependent variable, debt ratio, is defined here as the book value of debt 
divided by the book value of total assets.  Firm size is annual net sales in billions of 
$U.S., profitability is return on sales, and firm growth is the one-year growth rate in total 
assets.  We include dummy variables for 12 of the 13 industries, which are based on 
Campbell (1996) and correspond with the firm’s primary SIC code.  The number of 
observations declines when we control for firm growth due to missing data.  We control 
for the basic determinants of debt established in the corporate finance literature, namely, 
firm size, profitability, and growth. 
Table 2 considers nonfinancial firms as a separate category because differences in 
financial reporting make it misleading to compare nonfinancial and financial firms.  We 
find some evidence that larger firms have higher debt ratios, as predicted by Titman and 
Wessels (1988), and little evidence that more profitable firms have lower debt ratios, as 
would be suggested by Myers (1977).  Table 2, Column 1 shows a strong negative 
correlation between corporate governance ratings and debt ratios, which is not 
significantly affected when controls for size and profitability, industry dummies, industry 
and country dummies, and firm growth are included.  This result holds when we include 
financial firms in column 6 and 7, but it is weakened when firm growth and country 
dummies are included in column 7.  In results not reported, we find that firms in Asia   10 
 
drive these results, which is one reason for our focus on Asia in the empirical analysis.  
The magnitude of the coefficient on the CLSA rating indicates that a 10-point 
improvement in a firm’s corporate governance score is associated with a lower debt ratio 
of 2.3 percentage points. 
{Insert Table 3 here} 
Table 3 reports similar results from a much broader set of nonfinancial firms, 
using the Worldscope database and additional sources on cross-listings.  For this set of 
firms we have a variety of indicators of corporate governance, following Mitton (2002).  
Cross-listed is an indicator set equal to one if the firm is listed on a major U.S. exchange, 
either directly or in depository receipt form; listing on such an exchange is considered to 
represent better corporate governance.  Big Six auditor is an indicator set equal to one if a 
Big Six accounting firm audited the firm; having such an auditor was considered to 
represent better corporate governance, although we have not checked for an Arthur 
Andersen effect.  Diversified is an indicator set equal to one if the firm operates in more 
than one two-digit SIC industry; a more diversified firm is considered to have weaker 
corporate governance.  Ownership concentration is the percentage of shares held by the 
largest shareholder; higher concentration is considered to represent stronger corporate 
governance (if the large shareholder exerts power in the interest of minority 
shareholders). 
We conduct the analysis separately for three distinct regions.  Our data sources 
have over 3,000 firms for Asia, including Japan, and Western Europe but only about 300 
firms for Latin America.   Table 3 reports coefficient estimates from regressions of debt 
ratios on variables related to corporate governance.  In our Asian subsample, columns (1)   11 
 
through (3), weaker corporate governance is correlated with higher levels of debt.  The 
number of observations declines due to missing data as we add additional variables, but 
the coefficients remain fairly consistent across specifications.  The one exception is 
cross-listed, which increases greatly in magnitude and significance when size is added as 
a control.  From column (2) of Table 3, being cross-listed is associated with an 8 
percentage point lower debt ratio, having a Big Six auditor is associated with a 3.4 
percentage point lower debt ratio, and being diversified is associated with a 2.5 
percentage point higher debt ratio.  From column (3), an increase in ownership 
concentration of 10 percentage points is associated with a 1.4 percentage point lower debt 
ratio.  The results for Asia are similar if we exclude Japan from the sample, as columns 4 
through 6 demonstrate.
15  Although not reported, the coefficients are very similar if we 
include each corporate governance variable separately.  The results are unchanged 
qualitatively if country and industry dummies are omitted, with the exception that the 
coefficient on the diversified dummy loses statistical significance although it retains its 
sign. 
The correlation between governance and debt is much weaker for the Latin 
American subsample reported in columns 7 through 9, although this is probably because 
we have fewer firms.  However, it is also strikingly weaker for the Western European 
subsample reported in columns 10 through 12 and the number of firms is now 
comparable to the Asian subsample.  In Western Europe, being cross-listed is actually 
associated with having more debt.  Ownership concentration is the only variable that has 
a similar effect in Western Europe, although the coefficient is much smaller in this 
subsample.   12 
 
We present a simple model that incorporates the fact that debt is attractive when 
corporate governance is weak, either because the legal system is weak or because the 
firm chooses not to protect minority shareholders.  Our objective is to develop our 
intuition about the nature of propping and to suggest some simple empirical tests. 
 
3. A Simple Dynamic Model of Propping
16 
Consider an entrepreneur who controls one publicly traded firm and can steal any 
amount from this firm, including looting everything.
17  However, the entrepreneur can 
also prop up the firm’s performance with privately controlled funds.  Although the 
entrepreneur controls the firm, it has a separate legal status.  The entrepreneur owns a 
share equal to α  of the firm and outsiders own the remaining share β =1-α .  Retained 
earnings are denoted by I.  We assume that the capital structure is already in place and 
that the firm is operating.  In period t, the entrepreneur steals St of retained earnings from 
the firm and obtains utility equal to St. The cost of stealing is (St
2/2k).  The parameter k, 
which we assume to be no greater than I, represents the strength of the legal system so 
that a higher value of k means that stealing is less costly.   
Stealing is wasteful in the sense that it reduces the amount invested, i.e., there is 
an opportunity cost to diverting resources out of this firm. The entrepreneur invests what 
he does not steal in a project that earns a gross rate of return Rt in period t, from which he 
obtains a share equal to α .  We assume that the entrepreneur can steal as much as he 
wants from the firm before investment takes place, but he cannot steal the proceeds of the 
investment, at least not until the next period.  This assumption indicates that investors 
cannot observe investment and never know the per unit return, R, but they can see the   13 
 
level of physical activity of the firm, e.g., the quantity produced or the number of 
customers so that they can obtain a reasonable estimate of revenues.
18  To simplify the 
analysis, we assume that the support of Rt is contained on [0,1/α ].
19  Also, we assume 
that the stochastic variable Rt is persistent so that [Rt+1|Rt] dominates in a first order 
stochastic manner [Rt+1|Rt′ ] when Rt>Rt′ .  We assume that the entrepreneur observes Rt 
before choosing St and that outside investors never observe Rt. 
The publicly traded firm needs to make a debt payment, D, each period, that does 
not vary over time and cannot be renegotiated.
20  For example, D can be considered as the 
regular payment due on a long-term bond.  Therefore, the firm’s profit in period t is: 
F(St,Rt)=Rt(I-St)-D. 
We assume that, if in any period the firm’s profit including the debt payment is negative, 
bankruptcy is declared and the firm ceases to operate. Hence, no future profits or debt 
payments exist and no opportunities to steal these assets are now available.  Intuitively, 
the entrepreneur equates the marginal cost and marginal benefit of stealing.  Because the 
entrepreneur owns α  of the firm, he has an incentive to invest at least some of the firm’s 
assets rather than to steal them all.  As α  rises, the amount of stealing falls in equilibrium.  
As k rises, the amount of stealing rises in equilibrium.   
We determine the entrepreneur’s optimal behavior by solving the stochastic 
dynamic program.
21  The entrepreneur’s expected payoff in any period is: 
π g(St,Rt) = α  max[0,F(St,Rt)] + St - St
2/2k, 
which can be written as: 
                     π g(St,Rt) =  α  F(St,Rt)* H(F(St,Rt)) + St - St
2/2k,   14 
 
where H(x) = 0, if  x<0, and H(x)=1, otherwise.  Let δ  denote the discount factor.  The 
Bellman equation for the entrepreneur’s expected discounted present and future earnings 
can be written as: 
V(Rt) = maxS {π m(St,Rt) + δ *E[V(Rt′ ) | R] * H(F(St,Rt)) }; 
thus, the entrepreneur’s expected payoff is V(R0). 
The value function V(Rt) is strictly positive and non-decreasing in R as is its 
conditional expectation given by:  
W(Rt)=E[V(Rt′ ) | Rt], 
due to the persistence assumption.   Let Su(Rt) = argmaxS α  F(St,Rt)+St-St
2/2k. 
Solving the first-order condition yields: 
Su(Rt) = k(1 - α Rt), 
which would be the solution for a static model without debt found in Johnson, Boone, 
Breach, and Friedman (2000). 
First we consider the case in which δ =0 and future payoffs do not matter so that 
the entrepreneur’s optimization problem deals only with a single-period.  Hence, the 
problem can be written as: 
S*(Rt)=argmaxS α  max[0,F(St,Rt)] + St - St
2/2k. 
The function to be maximized is continuous with at most two local maxima.  Thus, we 
can show that the optimal policy is S*(Rt)=Su(Rt) for Rt≥ Rm and S*(Rt)=k for Rt<Rm, 
where Rm satisfies the following equation: 
F(Su(Rm), R+)+δ w+ Su(Rm) - Su(Rm)
2/2k = k/2.        (1) 
If D=0, then Rm=0 and we get the same result as in the model without debt in Johnson, 
Boone, Breach and Friedman (2000); however, if D>0, Rm>0.  In fact, Rm is strictly   15 
 
increasing in D.  Thus, for Rt<Rm the presence of debt causes the entrepreneur to loot if 
rates of return are too low, due to impending bankruptcy.  This looting effect is similar to 
the debt overhang results in Myers (1977). 
Returning to the case in which δ >0, but we assume, for simplicity, that R(t) is an 
independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variable.  Hence, W(Rt)>0 is 
independent of R so that we denote this value by w.  In this case, the entrepreneur’s 
optimization problem is written as: 
S*(Rt)=argmaxSt α  [F(St,Rt)+δ w]* H(F(St,Rt)) + St - St
2/2k.      (2) 
The function to be maximized has two local maxima and a single downward 
discontinuity at Sd(Rt)=I-D/Rt.  If D=0, the firm never goes bankrupt and S*(Rt)=Su(Rt).  
However, in general, the optimal decision policy, S*(Rt), can be of two forms depending 
on the relationship between Rm, which was defined in equation (1), and R+, which is 
determined as R+*(I-Su(R+))=D.  In other words, R+ is the rate of return at which the firm 
can just make its debt payment given the amount that the entrepreneur wants to steal.  If 
R+<Rm, the optimal policy is the same as in the case for δ =0.   However, if R+>Rm, the 
optimal policy function becomes more interesting because three regions of behavior are 
possible.   
In the first region, Rt≥  R+ and S*(Rt)=Su(Rt).  In this case, the presence of debt 
does not alter the entrepreneur’s behavior.  In the second region, S*(Rt)= k for Rt≤ R_, 
where R_ satisfies 
F(Sd(R_), R_)+δ w+ Su(R_) - Su(R_)
2/2k = k/2. 
Hence, the entrepreneur steals as much as possible, i.e., k from the firm, establishing the 
looting effect of debt.  In the intermediate region, R_≤ R≤ R+ and S*(Rt)=Sd(Rt).  Note that   16 
 
Sd(Rt) is increasing in Rt.   In this region, Sd(Rt)<Su(Rt) so that the presence of debt 
actually reduces stealing because the entrepreneur is trying to protect his future earnings.  
We call this the propping effect of debt because debt induces better performance by the 
entrepreneur from the perspective of shareholders. 
{insert Figure 1 here} 
These three regions are illustrated in Figure 1 in which stealing S(t) is represented 
on the y-axis and Rt is represented on the x-axis.  The dark line corresponds to S*(Rt), 
which is the optimal amount of stealing given the value of Rt.  The straight line from 
(0,k) to (1/α ,0) is Su(Rt) which is the optimal policy if debt were equal to zero.  As 
argued above, the presence of debt may reduce stealing by the entrepreneur in the 
intermediate region, R+>Rt>R_, because the entrepreneur steals less so that the firm will 
remain solvent.  In this region, debt strengthens the entrepreneur’s incentives to act in the 
interest of shareholders, as suggested by Grossman and Hart (1982), Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), and Jensen (1986).  In this intermediate region, the entrepreneur may even put 
some of his own money into the firm to prevent bankruptcy.  The reason for this behavior 
is that earnings in the future, both from profit sharing and stealing, are valuable so that 
the entrepreneur wants to keep the firm in business for these opportunities. 
In the region where Rt is small, the presence of debt increases the amount of 
stealing by the entrepreneur since the firm is going bankrupt so that there is no gain 
accrues from profits.  Debt overhang causes the entrepreneurs to steal more at the 
expense of outside shareholders and bondholders as in Myers (1977).  The qualitative 
aspects of this analysis are not changed if Rt is persistent but not necessarily i.i.d.  In this 
case, w is replaced by W(Rt) in equation (2).  Since this function is nondecreasing, the   17 
 
solution still has three types of regions, namely, the normal one in which debt has no 
effect, a looting region in which the debt increases stealing, and the propping situation in 
which debt causes the entrepreneur to steal less in order to protect the firm from 
bankruptcy. The major difference in the more general model is that the points at which 
the transition between regions occurs have to be derived by solving the complete 
stochastic dynamic program. 
 
4. Testing for Propping  
The anecdotal evidence discussed in the introduction suggests that propping 
occurs in some emerging markets.  Tables 2 and 3 present further information that is 
consistent with the presence of propping.  However, it is difficult to observe propping 
directly because it is relatively easy to hide transfers in and out of firms when investor 
protection is weak.  Furthermore, in contrast to tunnelling, minority shareholders and 
debt holders do not protest if propping occurs so that no scandals arise and not much 
public information is available.  However, if we think that investors discern the behavior 
of entrepreneurs, or if there is sufficient trading based on insider information, stock price 
performance may provide some useful information about propping situations. 
According to our theory, propping occurs when there is a negative shock to the 
macroeconomy.  This shock needs to be large enough to induce propping but not too 
large or otherwise looting occurs.  If such shocks are rare, evidence of propping will be 
difficult to find by examining performance over long periods.  These considerations lead 
us to construct a test using stock price performance at a time of an intense but short-lived 
economic crisis.  The Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 provides a quasi-natural   18 
 
experiment that allows us to test the effect of debt and corporate governance on firm-
level performance.  This crisis was undoubtedly an unexpected shock to Asian firms so 
that most of them could not adjust either their corporate governance or their debt levels 
immediately.  At the same time, relatively few firms collapsed or were looted outright.  
Therefore, we can infer how the stock market views different corporate finance 
arrangements during an economic crisis when, according to our theory, the incentive to 
prop should be strongest. 
Basically, we are looking for a difference-in-difference effect.  Within the set of 
publicly traded Asian firms, all of which experienced a stock price decrease due to the 
adverse macroeconomic shock, was this decrease larger or smaller for firms that could be 
expected to be propped by an entrepreneur?  Hence, we search for a particular interaction 
effect, namely, a propping propensity that is relevant only when there is a shock.  Critical 
to this analysis is a measure for the propensity to prop; to construct such a measure, we 
consult the literature on tunnelling.  Tunnelling appears to be more likely if a firm is part 
of a family group of firms.  If firms are organized in pyramids so that one firm is 
controlled by another firm, which may in turn be controlled by another firm, tunnelling is 
facilitated as La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) and Bertrand, 
Mullainathan, and Mehta (2002) argue.  Our theory suggests that tunneling and propping 
are basically symmetric behaviors so that so pyramids should also make propping 
easier.
22 
Table 4 reports coefficient estimates from regressions of debt ratios on a 
pyramidal ownership indicator.  The data come from nine Asian countries, namely, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand,   19 
 
and are compiled from the Worldscope database. The ownership data assembled by 
Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) are used to define pyramids and group affiliations.  
Pyramid is an indicator set equal to one if the firm is controlled through a pyramid 
structure.  Group affiliation is an indicator set equal to one if the firm is associated with a 
family business group.  We control for group affiliation in this context because some 
pyramidal firms may have better access to capital by virtue of being associated with a 
family group.   
Table 4 indicates a positive relationship between pyramidal control and debt 
ratios, even after controlling for size, profitability, and growth in column 2, and for group 
affiliation in column 3.  This relationship is robust to the inclusion of financial firms in 
columns 4 through 6.  The magnitude of the coefficients indicates that pyramid-
controlled firms have higher debt ratios of about two percentage points on average.  
Taken together, tables 2, 3 and 4 taken together demonstrate that, at least for Asian 
companies, weaker corporate governance is correlated with higher levels of debt.
23  These 
results are consistent with the work of Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001), who find higher 
levels of debt among Asian corporations that are more vulnerable to expropriation 
measured by group affiliation and divergence between cash-flow and control rights. 
Table 5 reports coefficient estimates from regressions of crisis-period stock 
returns on debt ratios.  These data are from the five Asian countries that were most 
affected by the crisis, namely, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.  
They are compiled from the Worldscope database in combination with data on ownership 
structure of firms assembled by Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000).  The crisis-period 
stock return is defined as the stock return in local currency over the period from July   20 
 
1997 to August 1998.
24  The key independent variable is the debt ratio, defined as the 
book value of total debt over the book value of total capital.  Financial firms and firms 
not included in the IFC global index are excluded, to ensure that the data are comparable 
and that stock prices are informative.  The dependent variable is stock price performance 
during the crisis.  Firms with more debt suffered larger falls in stock price, which is not 
surprising because leverage increases a firm’s covariation with the market and highly 
levered firms could also be hurt by exchange rate movements if their debt is dollar-
denominated.  More interesting is the fact that this effect is considerably stronger for non-
pyramid firms than for pyramidal firms.   
As Table 5 indicates, when we split the sample into pyramid and non-pyramid 
firms, the coefficient on the debt ratio for pyramid firms is less than half the magnitude 
and only marginally significant when we control for firm size in column (6).  The results 
are similar if we omit industry or country dummies, although the divergence between 
pyramid and non-pyramid firms is largest when we include both sets of controls.  
Alternatively, if we pool all firms and include debt, a dummy for pyramid, and a pyramid 
times debt interaction term, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive at 0.22, 
which is a little less than half the magnitude of the coefficient of -0.46 on debt, and 
significant with a t-statistic of 1.99.  The coefficients on debt and pyramid are both 
negative and significant in this unreported regression. 
These results suggest an interpretation of business groups as an organizational 
form.  If groups develop, they may be an effective way to prop up firms, but they can also 
facilitate more effective tunnelling.  However, both group and non-group firms can loot 
in the same way.  Therefore, the comparison of group and stand-alone firms depends on   21 
 
the relative importance of tunnelling compared with propping.  Group firms have an 
advantage when propping is relatively valuable to investors.  Under such conditions, 
group firms can raise capital more cheaply or undertake more projects than stand-alone 
firms.
25 
 
5. Conclusions 
There is strong empirical evidence that entrepreneurs tunnel resources out of 
firms in countries with weak investor protection.  There is also anecdotal evidence that, 
under some circumstances, the same entrepreneurs may prop up firms using their own 
private resources.  We developed a simple model in which it is optimal for entrepreneurs 
to prop when there is a moderate adverse shock, so that the firm stays in business.  In this 
model, the entrepreneur can commit to prop by borrowing rather than issuing equity.  
However, if the negative shock is too large, the entrepreneur loots the firm and it 
collapses. 
Evidence from the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 is broadly supportive 
of the idea that propping exists.  Asian firms in pyramids are more prone to tunneling, 
presumably because it is less costly to transfer resources between firms with this 
ownership structure.  We suggest that pyramid firms also find it easier to prop.  
Consistent with this idea, and the prediction of our model, we find that pyramid firms 
with more debt experienced smaller stock price declines during the crisis, controlling for 
other factors.   
These results are suggestive but the ideas presented here need to be tested further.  
Direct evidence on the size and nature of propping would be helpful.  The model fits the   22 
 
fact that corporate governance and debt are substitutes in emerging markets, i.e., worse 
firm-level corporate governance is associated with higher levels of debt.  However, we 
still need a more fully developed theoretical structure within which entrepreneurs choose 
an ownership structure and how they finance their activities, given that outside investors 
know both tunneling and propping are possible.   
If our results hold up under further theoretical and empirical scrutiny, there are 
several interesting implications.  The first is that even in countries with very weak legal 
protection for investors, it is possible for firms to attract money from outsiders.  
However, outside investment will tend to be in the form of debt rather than equity.  High 
debt ratios mean that there is propping in some negative scenarios, but if a shock is 
sufficiently bad, then firms will simply shut down.  This pattern of financing may help to 
explain why emerging markets with weak institutions can experience episodes of rapid 
growth, at the same time as remaining vulnerable to severe economic crises.   23 
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2 Mitton (2002) finds evidence of propping in diversified firms in Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand during the Asian crisis of 1997 to 1998.  His 
results suggest that the misallocation of investment in diversified conglomerates may 
become worse when an economy experiences a crisis. 
3 CP Group is a large complicated conglomerate and the precise nature of transactions 
involving privately held affiliates is difficult to discern.  In China, “CP has sold its stakes   30 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in Shanghai-Ek Chor Motorcycle and a brewery it set up with Heineken NV of the 
Netherlands… In Thailand, the group has sold its entire stake in Sunny Supermarkets, a 
24-hour grocery store chain; 75% of Lotus Distribution, which runs a discount-store 
chain; and a small stake in CP 7-Eleven, which runs a 24-hour convenience store 
franchise” (Asian Wall Street Journal, March 3, 1998).  At the same time, it supports its 
three companies that are listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand, namely, 
TelecomAsia, Charoen Pokphand Feedmill PCL, and Charoen Pokphand Northeastern 
PCL (Asian Wall Street Journal, March 3, 1998 and June 10, 1999). 
4 Some minority shareholders in the Hong Kong company have expressed concern that 
this transaction amounts to expropriating them in order to prop up the Indonesian 
company. 
5 The strongest evidence of systematic propping comes from Japan, where Hoshi, 
Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) find that banks provided capital to firms experiencing a 
liquidity shortfall, so long as the firms belonged to the same industrial group.  In Japan 
the transfers are not from the private pocket of an entrepreneur to a public company, but 
rather between linked companies, both of which may be public.  There is also evidence of 
tunnelling and propping in India (Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Mehta 2001) and Korea 
(Bae, Kang and Kim 2002, Joh 2003). 
6 This violates a basic assumption of Hart and Moore (1998), who model environments in 
which a debts are noncontingent payment stream, creditors have the right to foreclose in 
the event of a default, and credit has priority in bankruptcy.  In the environments 
considered in this paper, a creditor cannot foreclose or otherwise take control of assets in 
bankruptcy.   31 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 Asset stripping in bankruptcy happens in many countries.  Akerlof and Romer (1993) 
analyze a related form of looting that they argue occurs in the US.  In their model, the 
entrepreneur always intends to abscond with some assets and shift his debt onto the 
government. 
8 One informed observer reports, “I have yet to hear of a single case where Hong Kong 
liquidators have gone to China and succeeded in recovering assets” (Wall Street Journal, 
August 25, 1999, p.A14.)  More generally, very few debt defaults from the Asian crisis of 
1997 to 1998 have resulted in investors receiving any liquidation value.  The Economist 
reports “Despite the creation last year of a bankruptcy law in Indonesia where there had 
been none before, it is still virtually impossible to force a defaulted debtor into 
liquidation (the few creditors that have tried are still tangled up in legal appeals)” (30 
January 1999). 
9 In November 1999, Thailand Petrochemical Industries had still not reached a 
rescheduling agreement with its creditors more than two years after it suspended debt 
repayments (Financial Times, November 18, 1999.)  Korean private sector debt 
renegotiations were proceeding so slowly that, in the summer of 1999, the Financial 
Supervisory Commission created an alternative procedure for debt rescheduling and put 
pressure on banks to reach agreements with debtors (Choi 1999). 
10 Jensen (1986) suggests that high levels of debt can induce greater effort from 
managers.  In our terminology, he is proposing the existence of a non-cash variety of 
propping. 
11 In contrast, in the United States, it is illegal to provide financial support to a publicly 
traded firm unless this behavior is disclosed fully.  For example, a controlling shareholder   32 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
could not make a loan secretly or buy a product at inflated prices through another 
company that he controls.  More generally, it is illegal to manage earnings so that a firm’s 
financial performance looks better than it actually is. 
12 In addition, there is an indirect and less obvious effect of debt.  For a given level of 
desired funding, an increased use of debt reduces reliance on outside equity, thus 
allowing the entrepreneur to retain more ownership.  This reduces the moral hazard 
problem of the entrepreneur and, potentially, increases the value of the firm. 
13 CLSA ranked firms in 25 countries.  Of these, 21 of them had matches with 
Worldscope and are in our sample.  They are identified in Table 1, in the next-to-last 
column.  The other 4 countries that had no matches with Worldscope are the Czech 
Republic, Peru, Russia, and Venezuela.  Durnev and Kim (2002) give more details about 
the CLSA rankings. 
14 These CLSA measures are imperfect but they have some plausibility.  Khanna, Kogan 
and Palepu (2002) report that Indian firms with a lower CLSA score are more likely to 
experience corporate governance scandals.  Durnev and Kim (2002) and Klapper and 
Love (2002) have shown that firms with a better CLSA measure of corporate governance 
have higher valuations. 
15 The exception is cross-listed which is no longer significant. 
16 We use the basic structure of the entrepreneur’s decision from LLSV (2002) and 
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2000), although stealing takes place after the investment has 
been made in their models.  A static version of this problem appears in Johnson, Boone, 
Breach and Friedman (2000) and a discrete time variant with debt is developed in   33 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Friedman and Johnson (2000).  The intuition of the basic agency problem is close to 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
17 To avoid confusion, we divide expropriation into two parts.  The first is routine 
stealing, which can take place every period without the firm going out of business.  The 
second is looting, which consists of the entrepreneur grabbing all available assets so that 
the firm must shut down.  None of the terms we use are intended to convey a normative 
judgment or to imply that a particular behavior is actually illegal.   
18 Essentially, we are assuming that, if investors observe stealing, they will withdraw 
their support.  The entrepreneur steals before investing either because this can be 
concealed easily or, in the case of looting, because returns are so low that it is not worth 
undertaking any investment. 
19 No stealing occurs if α R is sufficiently high.  Given that α  is often high in emerging 
markets, an economic boom may make it optimal for the entrepreneur not to steal at all. 
20 We model the case where the firm has debt, but it could have equity with some debt-
like characteristics, e.g., the firm is punished if it has below market expectations for 
earnings, so that there is some incentive for smooth performance.  As long as both the 
entrepreneur and investors lose something when the firm goes bankrupt, the intuition 
behind our results holds. 
21 Because there are no infinitely long-lived securities, no pathologies such as bubbles 
can arise in our model. 
22 Wolfenzon (1999) develops a model in which entrepreneurial expropriation is 
consistent with the development of pyramidal ownership.  Our approach is 
complementary to his.   34 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
23 Alternative interpretations of these results are possible.  For example, diversified firms 
may have higher levels of debt because their revenues are less volatile, not because their 
governance is weaker.  However, taken as a group, these tables confirm this relationship 
between governance and debt for a broad sample of firms and for a variety of variables 
associated with corporate governance.  This relationship appears to be particularly strong 
in Asia. 
24 More discussion of this variable can be found in Johnson, Boone, Breach, and 
Friedman (2000) and Mitton (2002). 
25 This interpretation may explain why groups have an advantage in countries with weak 
legal environments as Khanna and Palepu (1997) argue but it also recognizes that groups 
may themselves steal or loot (see also Kim 2003).   Table 1
Summary Statistics by Country
Number of 
Worldscope 
firms
Number of 
nonfinancial 
firms
Average 
debt ratio %
Average 
sales ($bil)
Median 
profitability %
Median ownshp. 
conc. %
% Cross-
listed
% Big 6 
Audited
% 
Diversified
Firms in Claessens 
sample
% Group-
affiliated
% Pyramid-
controlled
CLSA-rated 
firms
Average 
CLSA rating
ARGENTINA 31 29 24.99 0.770 10.66 54.8 13.8 41.4 58.6 0 NA NA 1 66.7
AUSTRALIA 255 190 22.50 1.001 4.87 19.2 4.7 87.4 63.7 0 NA NA 0 NA
AUSTRIA 81 62 26.50 0.708 3.31 51.0 0.0 43.5 77.4 0 NA NA 0 NA
BELGIUM 137 83 25.52 1.619 2.59 50.1 0.0 39.8 94.0 0 NA NA 0 NA
BRAZIL 152 133 22.57 1.176 2.99 36.5 1.5 85.0 47.4 0 NA NA 29 61.6
CANADA 438 376 27.30 0.977 4.28 50.2 11.4 90.7 55.9 0 NA NA 0 NA
CHILE 77 62 22.37 0.357 11.35 43.4 14.5 80.6 64.5 0 NA NA 13 65.9
CHINA 98 90 25.33 0.175 9.04 56.7 2.2 26.7 35.6 0 NA NA 21 47.9
COLOMBIA 30 21 16.15 0.236 3.55 NA 0.0 33.3 38.1 0 NA NA 1 52.7
CZECH REPUBLIC 17 17 18.89 0.239 6.31 20.4 0.0 64.7 94.1 0 NA NA 0 NA
DENMARK 179 127 27.07 0.519 3.69 5.0 0.8 90.6 75.6 0 NA NA 0 NA
FINLAND 104 85 31.63 1.390 3.53 25.1 2.4 68.2 74.1 0 NA NA 0 NA
FRANCE 646 475 22.53 2.233 2.37 52.6 1.3 24.2 90.9 0 NA NA 0 NA
GERMANY 582 479 17.85 2.926 1.56 59.4 0.6 41.1 83.3 0 NA NA 0 NA
GREECE 125 97 25.93 0.102 5.83 50.1 0.0 4.1 76.3 0 NA NA 2 59.5
HONG KONG 363 268 23.60 0.437 6.14 46.2 0.4 84.7 88.8 318 45.6 23.6 37 64.9
HUNGARY 13 12 14.47 0.091 5.26 45.9 0.0 83.3 66.7 0 NA NA 2 54.9
INDIA 314 305 34.51 0.239 8.23 51.0 0.0 6.2 64.6 0 NA NA 73 52.8
INDONESIA 127 100 31.94 0.295 9.96 50.5 2.0 2.0 62.0 106 67.9 58.5 17 38.9
IRELAND 64 52 22.79 0.524 6.26 16.1 9.6 88.5 63.5 0 NA NA 0 NA
ISRAEL 42 32 21.03 0.442 5.32 50.0 15.6 6.3 65.6 0 NA NA 0 NA
ITALY 228 149 24.93 2.655 2.21 56.0 4.0 93.3 93.3 0 NA NA 0 NA
JAPAN 2,315 2,086 30.00 2.233 1.25 13.8 1.1 0.5 76.6 1,007 61.2 64.3 0 NA
KOREA (SOUTH) 258 210 48.03 1.976 1.13 13.5 1.4 0.0 60.0 236 50.8 33.1 22 46.6
LIECHTENSTEIN 4 1 21.66 1.650 9.23 NA 0.0 100.0 0.0 0 NA NA 0 NA
LUXEMBOURG 16 6 23.12 1.540 4.52 48.4 0.0 50.0 66.7 0 NA NA 0 NA
MALAYSIA 398 316 25.08 0.265 8.10 28.6 0.0 70.6 87.7 209 43.1 38.3 42 58.0
MEXICO 93 83 30.54 0.857 6.98 51.6 20.5 49.4 63.9 0 NA NA 8 62.0
NETHERLANDS 196 164 23.16 2.438 3.09 18.7 5.5 93.3 81.1 0 NA NA 0 NA
NEW ZEALAND 58 51 28.16 0.715 6.83 42.5 5.9 92.2 68.6 0 NA NA 0 NA
NORWAY 107 87 32.02 0.845 5.30 30.0 4.6 90.8 66.7 0 NA NA 0 NA
PAKISTAN 82 75 35.76 0.080 3.92 60.0 0.0 1.3 41.3 0 NA NA 11 29.2
PERU 36 29 23.77 0.117 7.78 73.0 6.9 24.1 41.4 0 NA NA 0 NA
PHILIPPINES 101 68 22.23 0.241 10.05 NA 1.5 7.4 48.5 98 65.3 30.6 20 39.9
POLAND 46 36 10.21 0.121 5.61 30.9 0.0 33.3 63.9 0 NA NA 2 40.5
PORTUGAL 78 58 26.36 0.323 2.50 47.7 1.7 34.5 51.7 0 NA NA 0 NA
SINGAPORE 216 172 22.33 0.279 5.35 35.1 0.6 87.8 86.0 193 18.1 65.8 39 67.9
SOUTH AFRICA 194 147 12.22 0.802 5.51 50.5 2.0 92.5 72.8 0 NA NA 34 68.1
SPAIN 161 116 18.61 1.193 3.26 50.5 1.7 87.1 65.5 0 NA NA 0 NA
SRI LANKA 18 12 22.46 0.036 4.63 38.9 0.0 83.3 50.0 0 NA NA 0 NA
SWEDEN 175 141 23.01 1.543 4.08 26.9 2.8 78.0 77.3 0 NA NA 0 NA
SWITZERLAND 175 132 30.26 1.935 3.16 38.1 1.5 70.5 77.3 0 NA NA 0 NA
TAIWAN 218 193 23.68 0.340 7.58 8.5 0.5 54.4 48.2 101 15.8 48.5 41 52.6
THAILAND 261 195 41.53 0.187 5.87 30.4 0.0 36.4 40.5 129 44.2 10.9 20 57.6
TURKEY 54 40 13.06 0.590 8.94 37.7 0.0 0.0 27.5 0 NA NA 12 38.3
UNITED KINGDOM 1,640 1,252 20.82 1.022 4.40 16.0 2.2 78.9 72.0 0 NA NA 0 NA
UNITED STATES 3,565 2,862 25.33 1.882 4.49 13.3 NA 95.6 49.3 0 NA NA 0 NA
VENEZUELA 15 12 22.24 2.782 9.45 NA 8.3 8.3 75.0 0 NA NA 0 NA
ZIMBABWE 4 3 4.87 0.042 18.26 63.0 0.0 100.0 66.7 0 NA NA 0 NA
     Total 14,591 11,795 2,397 447
The table reports summary statistics for firms in the Worldscope database, using most recent financial statements from June 1997 or earlier (usually year-end 1996).  Nonfinancial firms are those whose primary SIC code is not
between 6000 and 6999.  The Claessens sample refers to those firms matched with ownership data assembled by Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000).  CLSA-rated means that the firms were given a corporate governance 
ranking by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia.Table 2
Debt Ratios and Firm-level Corporate Governance Ratings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Corporate governance rating -0.302 *** -0.283 *** -0.301 *** -0.242 *** -0.232 *** -0.240 *** -0.148 *
[-4.07] [-3.69] [-4.41] [-2.86] [-2.75] [-4.20] [-1.93]
Firm size 0.655 *** 0.485 ** 0.315 0.214 0.378 *** 0.267 **
[3.69] [2.51] [1.39] [0.77] [2.87] [1.98]
Profitability -0.028 -0.054 -0.032 -0.032 -0.057 -0.029
[-0.58] [-1.14] [-0.74] [-0.72] [-1.33] [-0.70]
Firm growth 0.013 0.004
[0.61] [0.44]
Industry dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No No No Yes Yes No Yes
Number of observations 372           370         370 370 356 447 416
R-squared 0.055        0.067      0.232 0.319 0.319 0.242 0.296
Notes
(i) The number of observations declines in some specifications due to missing data. 
(ii) The numbers in brackets are heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics.  
(iii) Asterisks denote levels of significance with *** indicating significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
All firms Nonfinancial firmsTable 3
Debt ratios and Corporate Governance-related Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Cross-listed -0.707 -7.913 ** -9.540 ** -0.289 -2.349 -7.688 3.491 3.283 0.506 4.767 * 5.980 ** 8.566 **
[-0.22] [-2.32] [-2.13] [-0.05] [-0.34] [-1.10] [1.24] [1.12] [0.11] [1.85] [2.18] [2.10]
Big 6 auditor -3.332 *** -3.353 ** -5.212 *** -2.945 *** -3.069 ** -4.924 *** 4.262 ** 4.081 * -5.221 * -1.169 -0.829 -1.126
[-3.03] [-2.57] [-3.04] [-2.63] [-2.26] [-2.74] [2.06] [1.72] [-1.67] [-1.07] [-0.83] [-0.96]
Diversified 3.137 *** 2.493 *** 2.289 ** 4.008 *** 3.140 ** 4.366 ** 2.479 1.366 1.485 0.239 0.603 0.572
[4.09] [3.03] [2.29] [3.74] [2.53] [2.55] [1.39] [0.70] [0.48] [0.22] [0.62] [0.51]
Ownership concentration -0.141 *** -0.123 *** -0.138 ** -0.049 ***
[-6.12] [-3.58] [-2.44] [-3.11]
Firm size 0.313 *** 0.359 *** 0.260 0.119 -0.229 -0.363 -0.094 * -0.140 *
[6.73] [3.44] [1.26] [0.45] [-0.74] [-0.59] [-1.69] [-1.89]
Profitability -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.021 * -0.178 *** 0.000 0.000
[-0.79] [-0.42] [-0.62] [-0.38] [-1.88] [-3.22] [1.10] [1.31]
Firm growth 0.022 * 0.036 *** 0.040 ** 0.058 *** -0.002 *** -0.011 * 0.001 0.000
[1.71] [2.69] [2.54] [3.80] [-4.89] [-1.75] [1.03] [0.00]
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 3698 3319 2509 1612 1238 861 369 324 94 3469 3430 2706
R-squared 0.111 0.128 0.135 0.238 0.278 0.300 0.106 0.127 0.592 0.045 0.053 0.054
Notes
(i) Coefficients for a constant term, industry dummy variables, and country dummy variables were estimated but are not reported. 
(ii) The numbers in brackets are heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics.  
(iii) Asterisks denote levels of significance with *** indicating significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Asia (Japan excluded) Asia Latin America Western EuropeTable 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pyramid 1.876 ** 2.209 ** 1.832 * 1.876 ** 2.036 ** 2.203 **
[2.16] [2.25] [1.80] [2.16] [2.23] [2.35]
Firm size 0.298 *** 0.295 *** 0.291 ** 0.293 **
[6.30] [6.28] [6.42] [6.43]
Profitability -0.087 *** -0.086 *** -0.034 -0.034
[-2.66] [-2.65] [-1.64] [-1.65]
Firm growth 0.040 ** 0.040 ** 0.045 *** 0.045 ***
[2.16] [2.18] [2.91] [2.88]
Group affiliation 0.950 -0.448
[0.91] [-0.48]
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1935 1737 1737 2397 2144 2144
R-squared 0.134             0.179 0.180 0.131 0.171 0.171
Notes
(i) Coefficients for a constant term, industry dummy variables, and country dummy variables were estimated but are not reported.
(ii) The numbers in brackets are heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics. 
(iii) Asterisks denote levels of significance with *** indicating significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Debt Ratios and Pyramidal Ownership Structures
Nonfinancial firms All firmsTable 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Debt ratio -0.346 *** -0.414 *** -0.371 *** -0.440 *** -0.172 -0.188 *
[-4.98] [-5.79] [-4.50] [-4.88] [-1.49] [-1.72]
Firm size 0.096 *** 0.068 * 0.170 ***
[3.12] [1.86] [2.75]
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 305 305 184 184 121 121
R-squared 0.196             0.223 0.308 0.320 0.163 0.248
Notes
(i) Coefficients for a constant term, industry dummy variables, and country dummy variables were estimated but are not reported.
(ii) The numbers in brackets are heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics. 
(iii) Asterisks denote levels of significance with *** indicating significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
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